An information-theoretic model for image watermarking and data hiding is presented in this paper. Recent theoretical results are used to characterize the fundamental capacity limits of image watermarking and data-hiding systems. Capacity is determined by the statistical model used for the host image, by the distortion constraints on the data hider and the attacker, and by the information available to the data hider, to the attacker, and to the decoder. We consider autoregressive, block-DCT and wavelet statistical models for images and compute datahiding capacity for compressed and uncompressed host-image sources. Closed-form expressions are obtained under sparse-model approximations. Models for geometric attacks and distortion measures that are invariant to such attacks are considered.
Introduction
Data hiding refers to the nearly invisible embedding of information within a host data set such as text, audio, image, or video [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] . There is a broad variety of data one may want to hide in such data sets. In watermarking applications, the hidden data represent authorship information, a time stamp, or copyright information. In steganographic applications, the hidden data are a secret message whose mere presence within the host data set should be undetectable; a classical example is that of a prisoner communicating with the outside world under the supervision of a prison warden. In image database applications, the hidden data could represent a textual description of image features, or some complementary information (words, sound, etc.) about the original scene. In this context, data hiding represents a useful alternative to the construction of a hypermedia document, which may be less convenient to manipulate. A related application is in-band captioning of data such as foreign-language movie subtitles, stock-market data, etc.
In some of these applications, a malicious opponent may apply various data processing operations to interfere with a decoder's ability to recover the hidden data. In other applications, there is no malicious opponent, but various manipulations of the modified data set may result in similar unfortunate effects. Hence there is a need not only to develop ways to embed information in a nearly invisible fashion, but also to do so in a way that is robust against a broad variety of data processing operations, whether they are intentional or not. In this paper, we assume the presence of an attacker that attempts to disrupt the communication of hidden data, subject to certain constraints. We tend to use the terminology data hiding over watermarking, as the latter often suggests that a very limited amount of data is to be hidden within the data set; whereas our focus is on communicating significant amounts of information to a decoder.
Most research papers in the watermarking and data-hiding literature have focused on novel ways to hide data and to remove hidden data [1, 8, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] . However, the information-theoretic analysis that describes the fundamental limits of any watermarking or data-hiding system and can ultimately guide the design of efficient watermarking algorithms has been emerging only recently [9, 10, 11, 12] . Information theory yields results that are substantially different from those obtained so far in the data-hiding literature. A typical approach in this literature is to assume that the dataembedding and -decoding functions take a particular form, and that a particular type of attack is used [13, 14, 15] . Restrictions on the embedding and decoding functions can have a severe impact on performance, as evidenced by the large gap to capacity for commonly-used systems [11] . Dually, a system analysis that assumes a suboptimal attack yields overly optimistic results. To derive the fundamental limits of watermarking and data-hiding systems, one should avoid making a priori assumptions about the embedding and decoding functions, analogously to Shannon's analysis of the fundamental limits of communication systems [16] ; and one may want to assume an intelligent opponent, as is done in some game-theoretic analyses of jamming systems [17, 18] .
2
The goal of this paper is to develop estimates of data-hiding capacity, or maximum rates of reliable transmission, for host-image sources. To this end, we use several recent theoretical results, which are not yet well known in the data-hiding and image-watermarking communities, and are summarized in three sections. Sec. 2 describes our basic mathematical model; Sec. 4 gives capacity results for Gaussian channels; and Sec. 5 presents results for parallel Gaussian channels, which are used extensively in the remainder of the paper. While the results in Secs. 2, 4 and 5 apply to abstract probabilistic models, application of these concepts to image processing models presents substantial challenges. One needs to develop suitable models for attack channels, for distortion metrics, and for image statistics. The class of attack channels considered is described in Sec. 3.
In Sec. 6, we use the squared-error distortion metric and develop capacity expressions for images under autoregressive, block-DCT (discrete cosine transform) and more advanced inhomogeneous wavelet models. The role of sparsity of the host image is identified. This theme is also underlying in Sec. 7, which analyzes the effects of host-image compression on data-hiding capacity. In Sec. 8, we reexamine capacity under weighted squared-error metrics and under distortion metrics that do not penalize geometric attacks. Conclusions are presented in Sec. 9.
Notation. We use capital letters to denote random variables, small letters to denote their individual values, calligraphic fonts to denote sets, and a superscript N to denote length-N vectors. A theory has recently been developed to establish the fundamental limits of the fairly general data hiding problem depicted in Fig. 1 [11, 19] . A message M is to be communicated to a decoder. The message is embedded in a length-N sequence S N = (S 1 , · · · , S N ) termed host data set, typically data from an host image, video, or audio signal. The embedding is done using side information (e.g., a cryptographic key) K N = (K 1 , · · · , K N ) that is also available at the decoder. The resulting watermarked data or composite data X N = (X 1 , · · · , X N ) are subject to attacks that attempt to remove any trace of M from X N . The data-hiding process should be transparent: X N should be similar to S N , according to a suitable distortion measure. The system should also be robust: the hidden message should survive the application of any attack (within a certain class) to X N . There is a limit on the amount of distortion that an attacker is willing to introduce. This system can be analyzed by defining a statistical model for M, S N and K N , a distortion function, specifying constraints on the admissible distortion levels for the data hider and the attacker, and specifying the information available to all parties. Then one can seek the maximum rate of reliable transmission for M , over any possible data-hiding strategy and any attack that satisfy the specified constraints.
Basic Mathematical Model
The statistical model for (M, S N , K N ) is as follows.
• In typical image data-hiding problems, each datum S i is a block of data or transform data from an host image. For instance, S i could be a single pixel value, an 8×8 block of DCT coefficients, or a subtree of wavelet coefficients. These coefficients could be discrete-valued (following quantization) or real-valued. The host data S N = (S 1 , · · · , S N ) is a set of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) samples from a probability mass function 1 p(s), s ∈ X . For data hiding in a 512 × 512 image where S is an 8 × 8 block of DCT coefficients, we would have N = 4096.
• The individual letters
The side information K N potentially plays two roles. First, provide a source of randomness (cryptographic key) that is known to the decoder and enables the use of randomized codes. Second, provide side information about S to the decoder. The dependencies between S and K are modeled using a joint distribution p(s, k). For instance, S may be a function of K, meaning that S is fully available at the decoder; this scenario is sometimes called private watermarking. In blind watermarking (public watermarking) applications, K N does not convey any information about S N , so the decoder does not know the host signal. In some systems, no side information is used at all.
• The message M of interest is uniformly distributed over the message set M and is to be reliably transmitted to the decoder. M is independent of (S, K).
The embedding and attack are subject to distortion constraints. Consider a nonnegative,
A length-N data-hiding code subject to distortion D 1 is defined as a triple (M, f N , φ N ), where the message set M is defined as above, and
• f N is the encoder mapping a sequence s N , a message m, and a key k N to a sequence
This mapping is subject to the expected-distortion constraint
• φ N is the decoder mapping the received sequence y N and the key k N to a decoded messagê
1 Assume here that X is a discrete set.
4
An attack channel with memory, subject to distortion D 2 , is defined as a sequence of conditional
This is a constraint on the expected distortion with respect to the host signal S N that the attacker is willing to introduce. Related versions of this problem include the case of expected distortions relative to the watermarked image X N [11] and the use of pointwise distortions [20, 11] . Deterministic attacks are a special case of (3).
A rate R = 
Modeling of Attack Channel
The class of all attack channels A N (y N |x N ) that satisfy distortion constraints such as (3) is extremely large. To develop a capacity analysis, it is useful to first consider restricted classes of attack channels which include many attack channels used in practice. Developing a capacity analysis for the broadest possible class of attack channels is still an open problem, analogous to the study of arbitrarily varying channels in classical communication problems [21, 22, 18] . Capacity can be zero in some cases [20, 21, 22, 18] .
In Secs. 4-7, we first consider memoryless, time-invariant attack channels of the form
Such attack channels include addition of i.i.d. noise (in case X is a field), erasures, and JPEG-like 2 attacks (in case X is a block of 8 × 8 pixels). It has been shown that memoryless attacks are optimal in a qualified sense [10, 11] . A heuristic explanation for this effectiveness is that memoryless attacks introduce more randomness than attacks with memory.
In Sec. 8, we also consider attacks that have been difficult to cope with in practice, such as geometric attacks on images. A geometric attack, for instance, can be modeled as a global warping operation of the form y N = W (x N , θ), where θ is a parameter taking values in a set Θ. The mappings W (·, θ) and W (x N , ·) are invertible for all θ ∈ Θ and for all x N ∈ X N , respectively 3 .
Typically θ would be a shifting, scaling or rotation parameter, or any set of parameters representing a more complicated geometric warping operation. Even if the warping function W used by the attacker is known, the fact that the decoder may be unable to identify θ apparently makes such attacks very effective. While this is a commonly-held belief, a recent theoretical result shows that an optimal encoding/decoding system should be able to do very well even if θ is unknown [11, Prop. 6.6] . Specifically, consider warping attacks of the form above, applied to individual blocks of L data (rather than one single block of N data), where θ is a random variable taking independent values for each block (θ is i.i.d. p(θ), θ ∈ Θ). 4 Then the data-hiding capacity C satisfies the lower and upper bounds
where C * (typically a large number) is the capacity obtained in the absence of any attack or equivalently, obtained using a decoder that knows θ, and
Hence the loss in capacity is at most The mathematical model y N = W (x N , θ), θ ∈ Θ also applies to attacks such as tone-scale attacks, which modify (e.g., multiply) pixel intensities using a slowly varying function parameterized by θ. Other attacks that depend on a few parameters can be modeled similarly. What is important is not so much the specific form of W (x N , θ), but its basic mathematical properties: invertibility and dependence on a low-dimensional parameter θ. However, to make our presentation more concrete, we will refer to y N = W (x N , θ) as a warping attack.
Of course classical random attacks and warping attacks can be combined. This can be done as shown in Fig. 2 , where the attack channel is the cascade of a memoryless channel A(z|x), and a global warping operation y N = W (z N , θ), θ ∈ Θ. A result similar to (4) applies to the blockwise version of this problem, namely, capacity is nearly the same as if the warping attack did not take place [11] . as well as a decoder that knows the attack channel. To ensure that the channel is identifiable, one may have to transmit channel identification codes, e.g., embed a synchronization pattern in the host signal S N [23] . In some cases, the data-hiding codes themselves may be good identification codes.
In Sec. 2, we have given an operational definition of data-hiding capacity. Recent research has shown that this capacity is the value of a mutual-information game between the data hider and the attacker. For memoryless attack channels, capacity takes a form similar to the capacity derived by Gel'fand and Pinsker twenty years ago for a communication problem with a fixed noisy channel, and side information at the encoder [24] . The main result is stated in [11, Thm 3.3 ] [19] . The payoff function in the data-hiding game is a difference between two mutual informations.
Gaussian Channels. The case of Gaussian S and squared-error distortion measure d(x, y) is of considerable interest, because these models are useful in image processing, explicit solutions can be derived, and the results give upper bounds on capacity for non-Gaussian S [11, 25, 26] . Here we 2 , and S ∼ N (0, σ 2 ), meaning that S follows a Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and variance σ 2 . Remarkably, the data-hiding capacity is the same for both blind and nonblind data-hiding problems. Under the distortion constraints (2) and (3), we obtain [25] 
where
. The optimal attack is the Gaussian test channel from rate-distortion theory. In the case of small distortions (
, which is common in practical data-hiding
, i.e., the capacity expression is asymptotically independent of σ 2 .
Achievability of Capacity Bound. In principle, the capacity can be approached using a random binning coding technique [27, 28, 24, 11] . Research on structured data-hiding codes that approach this capacity bound is currently underway [9, 29, 30, 31] . The optimal decoder for Gaussian channels is a certain minimum-distance decoder.
Parallel Gaussian Channels
In this section, we review recent results from [25] on data-hiding capacity under MSE constraints; these results are essential to understanding the remainder of this paper. We use 1-D notation for simplicity. A simple extension of this setup to the case of weighted MSE constraints is presented in Sec. 8.1. Referring to Fig. 3 , consider a decomposition of the real-valued signal (image)
is termed subsignal and has a total of N k samples. The mapping T from S to the subsignals {S k } is one-to-one but need not be linear, so the multirate transform is not necessarily a conventional linear transform such as a subband transform or a block-DCT transform. In our parallel-Gaussian model, the subsignals {S k } are independent, and the samples
Define the per-sample distortion between two signals x N and
If T is unitary, d N is the normalized Euclidean distance in R N . Consider the following distortion constraints. The data hider designs the data-hiding scheme so that Ed(S, X) ≤ D 1 , and the attacker designs the attack so that
What is the data-hiding capacity under these constraints?
Capacity for Parallel Gaussian Sources
As in the Gaussian data-hiding game, the same value of capacity is obtained whether or not S N is available at the decoder [25] . Let d 1k and d 2k be the distortions introduced in channel k by the data hider and the attacker, respectively. The optimal data-hiding and attack strategies are memoryless (as in the single-channel case), and the channels are also independent. The solution is shown in Fig. 4 . The optimal data-hiding and attack strategies in each channel are those for a single Gaussian channel with host-signal variance σ 2 k and squared-error distortions d 1k and d 2k for the data hider and the attacker, respectively. The allocation of powers d 1 = {d 1k } and d 2 = {d 2k } between channels, satisfies the overall distortion constraints
and the 3K inequality constraints
for 1 ≤ k ≤ K. Fig. 4 goes here. The equilibrium of the data-hiding game is the solution of a constrained optimization problem involving optimal allocation of resources by the data hider and by the attacker (resp. signal and noise power) to the parallel channels. This is reminiscent of optimal power-allocation problems for parallel Gaussian channels in rate-distortion theory [28, Ch. 13.3.3] and in channel coding [28, 8 Ch. 10.4] . However, the data-hiding problem is more involved, because there is a maxmin game (as opposed to a simple minimization or maximization as in the aforementioned problems). The main result is stated in Theorem 1 below 5 . Using the notation of (5)
Theorem 1 [25] The data-hiding capacity for parallel Gaussian channels is equal to
where the maximization and minimization are subject to the 3K + 2 constraints above. If 
in the open interval 0,
The Lagrange multipliers λ 1 < 0 and λ 2 > 0 achieve C = max λ 2 >0 min λ 1 <0 r(λ 1 , λ 2 ). The distortion constraints (7) and (8) are satisfied with equality.
The maxmin optimization problem above can be converted into a convex Lagrangian optimization problem [25] . The execution time of the algorithm is approximately two seconds on a Sparc 20 workstation for problems involving 100 channels.
Properties of Solution
(Low power allocation to weak channels). The capacity
The power allocations d 1k and d 2k also tend to zero, and satisfy the asymptotic expressions
As expected, the data hider should allocate fewer resources to weak channels.
(Uniform power allocation to strong channels). If σ 2
k → ∞, then (13) shows that the optimal d 1k depends only on λ 1 and λ 2 . Equations (14) and (5) respectively imply that the same holds for d 2k and C k . These asymptotic expressions are the same for all k, provided that 
Spike Models
Then it follows from Properties 1 and 2 that
is the fraction of strong signal components. In conclusion, for spike models:
1. The optimal power allocations by the data hider and the attacker are independent of the signal variances {σ 2 k } in the strong channels, provided that these variances are large relative to D 1 and D 2 .
2. The optimal data-hiding strategy equalizes the power among the strong channels, and likewise, the optimal attack strategy equalizes the noise power among strong channels. Negligible power is allocated to weak channels 6 .
3. The (per-sample) capacity C k is the same for all strong channels and is negligible for the weak channels. The capacities {C k } in the strong channels and C = k r k C k depend only on the distortion levels D 1 and D 2 , and not on the variances σ 2 k .
Upper Bounds on Capacity
Parallel Gaussian models are useful in that they are reasonably tractable and provide capacity expressions for realistic signal models. Interestingly, they also provide upper bounds on capacity if the actual distribution of S differs from the model. For instance, any correlation between subsignals S k would decrease capacity, and so would any deviation from a Gaussian distribution with the same second-order statistics [25] . For non-Gaussian S, the Gaussian upper bound (12) on capacity is asymptotically tight as D 1 and D 2 tend to zero, and in this case the capacity-achieving distributions are the same as in the parallel-Gaussian case. A fundamental implication of this result is that the exact distribution of the source plays only a second-order effect in a small-distortion scenario. 6 As is done in most data-hiding schemes used in current practice. 
AR(1) Models
We begin our analysis with a classical (but simplistic) AR ( 
We can compute data-hiding capacity estimates for image sources characterized by different values of ρ x , ρ y , and σ 2 (the value of µ has no bearing on capacity). We chose parameters that are representative of images such as Lena. We let ρ x = ρ y = 0.95, σ 2 = 2500, and fix D 1 = 10, corresponding to a subjectively determined just-noticeable visibility threshold for a reference i.i.d.
white noise pattern. Fig. 5a show the original 512 × 512 Lena image. Fig. 5b and c (resp. d and e)
show the output of the data-hiding channel and the attack channel respectively, using the optimal power allocations derived for D 1 = 10 and D 2 = 20 (resp. for D 1 = 10 and D 2 = 50). We let D 2 vary between 10 and 50.
The capacities were computed using the numerical algorithm mentioned in Sec. 5.1 (see footnote therein) with a uniform discretization of the log S(f x , f y ) range into K = 256 channels. The capacity per sample in each channel is displayed in Fig. 7 . This graph illustrates the two properties mentioned in Sec. 5.1: there is a saturation of the capacity C k in a given channel when the variance σ 2 k in that channel increases, and C k is proportional to σ 2 k for small σ 2 k . Fig. 7 goes here.
The influence of the correlation parameter on C is illustrated in Fig. 8 , 
As ρ x = ρ y approaches 1, capacity tends to zero, as more and more channels (frequencies) become weak and hence are unable to hide significant information. 
Block-DCT Models
An 8 × 8 block DCT gives rise to an image representation that consists of 64 equal-size channels 7 .
Capacity estimates can be computed from Theorem 1, assuming that the data in each channel are i.i.d. Gaussian, and that the channels are independent. The independence assumption is a simplification, but is reasonable when applied to the 63 AC coefficients. The independence assumption applied to the DC channel is more crude. JPEG, for instance, uses a simple predictive model to capture correlations between DC coefficients of adjacent blocks. Hence the analysis below could be refined by using a dependent-process model for the sequence of DC coefficients. Finally, the actual distribution of the coefficients is more heavy-tailed than a Gaussian; Laplacian models are often used for DCT coefficients. Fig. 9 shows the capacity obtained using a typical set of channel variances {σ 2 k } (solid curve in Fig. 15 ). These variances were evaluated for the 512 × 512 Lena image. Also note that the spike approximation is quite accurate here too. Fig. 10 shows the optimal power allocations {d 1k } and {d 2k } between channels. The two asymptotic regimes discussed in Sec. 5.1 are clearly seen on these plots. First, a saturation phenomenon occurs for large σ 2 k . Second, the ln d 1k and ln d 2k vs ln σ 2 k curves tend to straight lines with slopes equal to 2 and 1, respectively, as σ 2 k → 0. In case the block-DCT coefficients are not independent and/or do not follow a Gaussian distribution, the capacity results above (using the correct values of {σ 2 k }) are strict upper bounds on actual capacity. This follows directly from the properties mentioned in Sec. 5.3. Note that a similar conclusion may not be drawn from the study of autoregressive models in Sec. 6.1: the actual variances are generally not consistent with an autoregressive model, and using the capacity expressions of Sec. 6.1 would yield misleading results.
Wavelet Models
Two influential papers in recent image compression literature are those by Joshi et al. [34] and LoPresto et al. [35] , which constructed state-of-the-art wavelet image coders based on closely related statistical models. These papers respectively assumed that the wavelet coefficients are Gaussian and generalized-Gaussian distributed, with zero means and variances that depend on the coefficient location within each subband. Assume these variances take their values in a finite set
Typically K is equal to eight times the number of subbands, say K = 80 [34] . If {σ 2 k } are treated as known deterministic quantities, the model is again of the form shown in Fig. 3 . Otherwise one may assume that the variance field is slowly varying [35] and can be reliably estimated by the decoder. This model [35] for the wavelet coefficients is commonly referred to as the EQ model. We note that such adaptive Gaussian models have been successfully used in image denoising and restoration as well [36, 37, 38] .
To obtain representative values of the variances σ 2 k , 1 ≤ k ≤ K for typical images, we proceeded as follows:
1. Select a discrete wavelet transform -say a 5-level decomposition using Daubechies' length-8 filters [39] . Apply this transform to an image that is representative of some hypothetical class of images.
2. Estimate the local variance in a 5 × 5 window centered at each wavelet coefficient.
3. Quantize the natural logarithm of each of these real numbers using a uniform quantizer with K reproduction levels and quantizer step size ∆. We used K = 256 in our experiments. All coefficients within a subband that have the same quantized variance are said to form one channel. The subsampling factors r k for the channels are given in the top panel of Fig. 11 for Lena. The capacity per sample in each channel is displayed in the bottom panel of Fig. 11 . The product K∆ is fixed by the range of the log-variances, and the estimate of data-hiding capacity converges to a limiting value if ∆ is made small enough. The value K = 256 was chosen accordingly. Fig. 12 shows the corresponding power allocations d 1k and d 2k on a log scale. Again, the two asymptotic regimes discussed in Sec. 5.1 are clearly seen on these plots. Fig. 13 shows capacity as a function
Similar experiments were conducted for other images. Fig. 13 and Table 1 show, the spike-model approximation to capacity is quite accurate. Using a spike model amounts to classifying wavelet coefficients into two classes: those with very small variance and those with very large variance (relative to D 1 and D 2 ). This classification can be done by using the quantization method above with a two-level quantizer, with a very large value of ∆.
Block-DCT vs Wavelet EQ Model. Comparison of Fig. 9 and Fig. 13 reveals that capacity estimates under the wavelet EQ model are lower than those under the block-DCT model. Since both expressions are upper bounds on actual capacity (where equality can be achieved only if the channels are independent and Gaussian), we conclude that the upper bound given by the wavelet EQ model is tighter. This is consistent with the sparsity properties of both image representations.
Fig. 14 displays a measure of sparsity, namely, the fraction of transform coefficients whose variance is greater than t, plotted as a function of t. As this plot shows, the EQ model is indeed significantly sparser than the DCT model. It is seen for instance that under the EQ (resp. DCT) model, only 24% (resp. 44%) of the samples are in channels such that σ 2 k > 40, and 16% (resp. 27%) of the samples are in channels such that σ 2 k > 100. The threshold t = 40 (resp. t = 100) is our spikeapproximation threshold t = 2D 2 when D 2 = 20 (resp. D 2 = 50). This explains why the spike approximation to capacity under the EQ model is also lower than under the DCT model. 
Color Images
The study above can be extended to color images, by choosing a color space in which the color components are approximately independent (such as Y C r C b ) and formulating parallel-Gaussian models on these images. The number of channels is three times larger than in the monochrome case. Chrominance channels are sparser than luminance channels, as indicated by the variances of block-DCT channels in Fig. 15 , and hence contribute less to data-hiding capacity. One could similarly compute capacity estimates for hyperspectral images with arbitrarily many hyperspectral planes. Fig. 15 goes here. Images with N color pixels may be viewed as vectors in R 3N (obtained by stacking N subvectors
, each representing an individual color pixel). Referring to Fig. 3, consider the decomposition of one such color image x N using a transform T with 3N output real-valued coefficients {x k (n)} distributed among K channels. The per-pixel distortion between two color images x N and x N ∈ R 3N is defined by extension of (6) as
where 
Compressed Host Signals
Often data are to be hidden within compressed images. Of course one expects that a side effect of compression is to reduce data-hiding capacity, but by how much? Below we derive the solution under a parallel Gaussian model for the image source.
Denote by v(n), 1 ≤ n ≤ N , the uncompressed host signal and by s(n), 1 ≤ n ≤ N the compressed signal to be watermarked. The signal v(n) satisfies the statistical model of Sec. 5:
the subsignals V k are independent, and the samples
The transform T is assumed to be orthonormal. Let D = E(V − S) 2 be the distortion of the host signal due to compression, and assume that rate-distortion-optimal codes for parallel Gaussian channels are used [28, Sec. 13.3.3] . In this case, the subsignals S k are independent, and the samples
Here σ 2 k is given by the classical reverse water-filling theorem:
the distortion in channel k due to compression is
and the nonnegative parameter λ is such that k δ k = D. The joint distribution of V k and S k is given by the Gaussian test channel with distortion δ k . The bit rate for S is given by
Of course, compression tends to increase the sparsity of the host signal because some of the channels may be set to zero, according to (17) . Under our compression model, S still satisfies a parallel-Gaussian model, so Theorem 1 still gives the data-hiding capacity C for S. We are interested in comparing C with the data-hiding capacity
v,k for all k, and hence C ≤ C V . In low bit rate applications, S could be considerably more sparse than V , and the reduction in data-hiding capacity could be significant.
To obtain a quick but useful estimate of the loss of data-hiding capacity due to compression of V , consider the spike model approximation for both V and S, with respective sparsity factors r * V and r * ≤ r * V . In this case, the data-hiding capacity is reduced from
The effects of host-image compression on data-hiding capacity are illustrated in Table 2 and per pixel has a relatively small effect on data-hiding capacity. This is not too surprising, because power is mostly allocated to strong channels (especially if D 2 /D 1 is large, see Fig. 12 ), and those channels remain strong even after mild compression. At rates below 1 bit per pixel, some of the moderately strong channels become weak (or even zero), and hence the loss in data-hiding capacity becomes more significant. Similar effects are observed for other images, see Table 2 . Table 2 goes here. Fig. 17 goes here.
Perceptual Distortion Metrics
Another major difficulty arises when trying to apply the theory above to image processing. The MSE distortion metric is not well matched to the human visual system [33, 40, 7] . Moreover, in a game with the attacker, the MSE metric may be quite inappropriate, because spatial shifts, rotations, and other geometric warping operations introduce negligible loss in subjective signal quality, even though the resulting MSE may be large. Ideally one would like to use a perceptual distortion metric, but there is currently no universally accepted such metric, and analysis based on perceptual metrics is likely to be intractable. How strongly does the capacity formula in Theorem 1 depend on the distortion metric used? To gain some insight into that problem, we first consider classical weighted squared-error metrics. Then we study a modified MSE metric that is invariant to geometric attacks.
Weighted MSE
In some problems, a weighted mean-squared error (WMSE) criterion [33, 40] might be more appropriate than the MSE used so far:
where w k , 1 ≤ k ≤ K are positive weights, and x N , x N are any two images in R N . Observe that the data-hiding problem expressed in terms of a constraint on the WMSE (19) can be reduced to a problem stated in terms of the MSE (6), if the samples in channel K are multiplied by √ w k after application of the multirate transform T, see Fig. 18 . These scale factors can be absorbed into T; hence the capacity formulas of Secs. 5.1-7 apply directly, with weighted variances {w k σ 2 k } in lieu of the original host-signal variances {σ 2 k }. A similar analytic technique has been used in the context of signal compression [40] . Fig. 18 goes here. For some channels we could have w k = 0; such channels have zero data-hiding capacity and may be arbitrarily tampered with by the attacker, without his incurring any penalty. For color images for instance, the attacker might be satisfied with a monochrome version of the watermarked image.
If the weighting factors w k for the chrominance channels are zero, converting the color image to a monochrome image would be a legitimate attack. It is then impossible to reliably hide information in the chrominance components of the host image.
We experimented with WMSE metrics, by selecting a set of nonuniform weights {w k } for the model in Fig. 3 and computing the resulting capacities for monochrome and color image models. We used the block-DCT model with weights given by w k = γ/q 2 k , where q k is the default JPEG quantizer step [41] in channel k (64 and 192 channels for monochrome and color images, respectively.) The motivation for this choice is that noise with variance proportional to q 2 k would be perceptually white. The arbitrary constant γ was adjusted so that the just noticeable distortion level for the reference i.i.d. noise stimulus in Sec. 6 would be equal to that in the unweighted case. Hence
The results using these weights are shown in Fig. 16 . There appears to be relatively little difference between capacities computed using weighted and unweighted squared-error distortion measures. Channels with low weights w k are high-frequency channels, which already have low hiding capacity under unweighted distortion measures. Hence the effect of weighting, as seen from Fig. 3 , is generally to make weak channels even weaker and strong channels stronger. Such operations have little effect on capacity, so discrepancies between capacity estimates for weighted and unweighted distortion measures are primarily due to a few strong channels becoming weak and vice-versa. These results suggest it may be an overkill to use complex perceptual models to refine a simpler analysis of data-hiding capacity based on squared-error distortion measures. Similar conclusions have been obtained in image compression using rate-distortion-optimized coders where MSE (and not weighted MSE) as the cost function used to select various coder parameters [42] .
For color images, both the variances σ 2 k (see Fig. 15 ) and the weighting factors w k for chrominance channels are lower than those for luminance channels; both of these factors reduce the chrominance channels' data-hiding capability.
Invariant Distortion Metrics
Consider a distortion metric that does not penalize warping attacks in the diagram of Fig. 2 :
for all z N and θ ∈ Θ such that
The definition (20) implies that the new distortion d N W (·, ·) is invariant to warping operations with parameters θ ∈ Θ.
Suppose first that the parameters θ of the geometric attack are identifiable (see Sec. 3). In practice this may require that the host signal S N contain a synchronizing pattern [23] . Then our invertibility assumption on W (·, θ) implies that the decoder can retrieve z N in Fig. 2 , and so the data-hiding capacity under the distortion metric (20) is the same as that given by Theorem 1, under the MSE metric.
If θ is nonidentifiable, the same issue mentioned in Sec. 3 arise. If the warping attack is applied independently on blocks of length L, the capacity is essentially the same as that of a decoder that knows θ used for each block. Hence the capacity result of Theorem 1 essentially applies again.
Threshold Vision
Due to threshold effects in the human visual system, it is possible to modify an image without JNDs have been used extensively in the design of practical watermarking systems [7] , evaluating capacity formulas for this particular distortion model (with D 1 = 0) remains to be done. 18 
Conclusion
We have characterized data-hiding capacity for realistic image sources, by application of recent theoretical results on parallel Gaussian channels. Several statistical image models have been considered, ranging from conventional ones such as autoregressive processes and block-DCT models, to more advanced wavelet models that capture the spatial clustering of wavelet coefficients. The results obtained are guaranteed to be upper bounds on actual capacity if the true model deviates from the assumed parallel Gaussian model. The analysis demonstrates the essential role of image sparsity in determining capacity. The EQ wavelet model we considered captures sparsity much better than does the simpler block-DCT and autoregressive models, and yields better capacity estimates.
Our basic capacity results have been derived under MSE constraints on the data hider and on the attacker. We have also considered two types of perceptual distortion metrics: a weighted MSE, and a modified MSE metric that is invariant to geometric attacks. It appears that the dependence of capacity on the actual distortion metric used is quite weak. Moreover, we have shown that the loss in capacity due to geometric attacks may be quite benign.
Research is already underway on data-hiding codes that approach capacity for Gaussian channels. The results presented in this paper should likewise help design data-hiding codes that approach the capacity limits for images. The performance of several watermarking codes has been studied in several recent papers [30, 43, 44, 45] .
Closely related to these efforts is the development of optimal decoders. This requires moving beyond the conventional correlation rules and normalized correlation rules that have often been used in the image watermarking literature, due to their simplicity. An optimal decoder needs to be designed jointly with the encoder, and may need to be provided with the means to reliably estimate various unknown source and channel parameters.
A Outline of the Proof of Theorem 1
The main ideas used in the proof of Theorem 1 are:
is additive over k, and so are the distortion constraints (7) and (8) . The other 3K constraints (9) (10), and (11) apply to each channel separately.
2. For any d 1 , the constrained minimization problem is reformulated as the dual maximization problem max λ 2 ≥0 q(d 1 , λ 2 ) , where the dual variable λ 2 ≥ 0 corresponds to the distortion constraint (8). 
We have
where r is strictly convex in λ 1 . This maxmin problem is solved using a standard numerical algorithm.
A numerical optimization algorithm based on these properties is described in [25] . The dual vari- Figure 3 : Decomposition of host signal S into K channels, using a (possibly nonlinear) multirate transform T.
A(y|x) Figure 4 : Optimal data-hiding and attack strategies for parallel Gaussian channels
The channels are decoupled, with optimal power allocations {d 1k }, {d 2k } between channels is given in Theorem 1.
; Z k and W k are independent of S k and X k respectively. Table 2 : Total data-hiding capacities (in bits) for compressed images, under the same assumptions as in Table 1 .
